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SUBJECT: DARFUR: P-3 AND DPKO FOCUS ON AU SUMMIT
DELIVERABLES

REF: (A) USUN 018 (B) USUN 028

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Classified By: Acting Permanent Representative Alex Wolff for Reasons 1
.4 b/d.

11. (C) SUMMARY. P-3 principals and DPKO chief Guehenno agreed on January 15 that the January 29-30 African Union Summit presents an important opportunity for achieving clarity on the way forward in Darfur. USUN and UKUN principals pushed Guehenno to use scheduled high-level UN-AU meetings on January 18-19 in Khartoum to finalize the "heavy" UN support package for AMIS and set the stage for Summit deliverables to include confirmation of previous agreements on the "hybrid" areas of force size, mandate (adding a protection of civilians plank in particular), and command and control. Meeting participants agreed that solid UN-AU agreement on these heavy and hybrid aspects is essential to finalization of funding and facilitation of force generation. Guehenno and A/SYG Annabi suggested that UN member states, led by the P-3, could usefully engage the AU in advance of both sets of meetings to encourage AU leaders to get ready to take on greater responsibility as the heavy phase builds and eventually gives way to the hybrid phase. After the theatrics of January 10 Council consultations, discussion on Chad on January 15 was confined to consideration of whether the humanitarian crisis there might be relieved by deployment of a peacekeeping force even in the absence of a political process. END SUMMARY.

Light Package Lighter Than Hoped; Heavy Package Resists
Closure

2, (C) In follow up to January 10 Security Council consultations marked by unusually testy exchanges between A/S Annabi and several Council members (ref A), P-3 UN principals met on January 15 with UN Undersecretary for Peacekeeping Operations Jean-Marie Guehenno, UN Africa Division A/SYG Hedi Annabi, and other senior DPKO officials to more calmly strategize. After the lengthy January 10 session devoted primarily to Chad, discussion at the later meeting focused primarily on Darfur. Guehenno reiterated that 36 staff have been deployed in connection with the UN's "light" support package for AMIS, several more are in the pipeline, and 31 positions have yet to be filled by donors.

13. (C) Regarding the "heavy" support package, Guehenno said a senior DPKO team would meet with AU officials January 18-19

in Khartoum in an attempt to reach accommodation on three items (attack helicopters, formed police units, and human rights officers) that have become sticking points. (NOTE. The AU and UN both want to deploy the helicopters, but they haven't been procured; the AU is resisting the police units (probably on behalf of the Sudanese Government), but the UN insists on them to protect deployments; the AU wants human rights officers to report in the AU chain of command, but UNHCHR refuses to delegate its responsibility. END NOTE.) Annabi said DPKO officials thought they had a final deal on the heavy package after December 4-7 meetings, but "it has been re-opened." If a deal can (again) be reached with the AU, UN and AU officials would jointly present it to Sudan President Al-Bashir in the tripartite context.

14. (C) Annabi said a final deal on the heavy package, when realized, would be presented to potential troop contributing countries (TCC's) in an effort to generate the 3,000 troops envisaged. He added that a TCC meeting last week produced only one expression of interest -- from Bangladesh -- and that the AU (Chairman Konare in particular) has been decidedly cool to the idea of bringing non-African troops into the heavy force. A/SYG for Peacekeeping Operations Jane Holl Lute said "self-sustainability capacity doesn't exist among African forces," so that using them for the heavy force would necessitate some manner of "sponsorship arrangements."

Engaging An Elusive AU on the Heavy-Hybrid Transition

15. (C) Annabi said there has been "lots of reluctance at AU-AMIS" to engage in discussions with DPKO on the hybrid force. A high-level meeting had been tentatively scheduled for mid-January, but the AU has asked for a postponement until mid-February in deference to the January 29-30 AU Summit in Addis Ababa. DPKO countered with a suggestion that

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hybrid force discussions follow immediately on the January 18-19 heavy package discussions in Khartoum. The AU has tentatively agreed, provided the heavy package comes together first.

16. (C) USUN Charge Wolff suggested that the AU Summit provides an opportunity for achieving clarity and closure on the elements of the heavy-hybrid transition, urging that Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon use the Summit to secure AU

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commitment to the specifics of the hybrid force. Arguing that we have spent too much time trying to finesse with the AU command and control, force generation, and other issues, Charge Wolff suggested the time has come to reach closure. Otherwise, he said, troops in the field transitioning from a heavy to a hybrid configuration, theoretically next July 1, will suddenly have to shoulder much greater responsibilities, especially regarding protection of civilians. He suggested that we instead impress on the AU that its mandate needs beefing up and its troops in the field need to steadily increase functional capacities because we need a force that can be ready to handle all this by July 1.

17. (C) To Lute's plea that "we can't give AMIS a mandate beyond its capacity," Guehenno said that building AMIS capacity is essential to a successful heavy deployment and a successful heavy-hybrid transition. Reminding all that the heavy package is itself a transition phase, he added that "the heavy package makes sense only if the hybrid package is on its way -- otherwise the high visibility heavy deployment will become a high visibility failure." Backtracking, Lute said, "our view has always been to beef up AMIS to allow a smooth heavy-hybrid transition." Annabi appealed for help in getting the AU to accept a growing AMIS mandate, suggesting that the P-3 "do the political heavy lifting" by asking the AU to accept a broader mandate. Ambassador Wolff wrapped up this portion of the discussion by urging that the UN and P-3

together and separately focus on "using the Summit to get the agreement we want," particularly by attempting to persuade Chairman Konare that the Summit is a major opportunity for the AU and him.

Heavy Package Money: It's Not In Place

18. (C) Lute said that the DPKO has paid for the light package by borrowing from UNMIS. This she said has not been a major burden (\$2 million to date) but has perhaps set a bad precedent in that there has been insufficient realization that the UN funding process for the heavy package must be respected. She said DPKO cannot go the Fifth Committee to ask for a minimum \$180 million in assessed funds for the heavy package until we have clarity on what is in the package. The UK PermRep reminded participants that the UK had paid \$15 million early this month against ongoing AMIS expenses but had not committed to pay more. (NOTE. DPKO estimates AMIS operation expenses at \$360 million for the first six months of 2007. END NOTE.)

Chad: Clarification Of Conditions In Camps

19. (C) Guehenno and Annabi summarized the state of play in Chad regarding the return of the technical assessment mission and the deployment of an advance team (reftels). Following on the testy exchanges of the January 10 Council consultations, the UK PermRep raised only one follow-on matter -- the protection of civilians in refugee camps. He argued that this protection should not depend on the establishment of a political process, one of the primary aims of the advance team. Guehenno argued that lives have not been lost in Chad camps (unlike the situation in Darfur) but "in places where people are moving." UNHCR, he said, "doesn't want us in the camps because the rebels are leaving the camps alone." He said the need for protection of civilians in Chad is greatest among the 100,000 IDP's, who are not in camps, implying that protection of such a large mobile population could only be part of a comprehensive deployment. UKUN PermRep rejoined that individual attacks, especially against women, are taking place in the camps and that the 190 gendarmes dedicated to the issue are insufficient. DPKO did not dispute the point.

WOLFF